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[L. A. No. 22313. In Bank. July 7, 1953.J 
LEONARD F. HERZOG et ai., Respondents, v. PAUL J. 
GROSSO et at. Appellants. 
[1] Easements-Obstructions-Fences and Gates.-ln action to 
quiet title to easement for road purposes over defendants' land, 
a judgment declaring that defendants have no right to main-
tain fence and gates at .iuncture of road with highway and 
ordering their removal is proper where plaintiffs' home is 
located in a large city "nd the road should be kept un-
obstructed for adequate access by the fire department, police 
department and other public agencies, and where defendants 
could be adequately protected by putting up signs to prevent 
motorists from mistaking road for a public road. 
[2] Id.-Maintenance-Guardrails.-Owners of an easement for 
road purposes have a right to construct and maintain a guard-
rail along boundary of road adjoining a steep embankment, 
since guardrails are reasonably necessary to enjoyment of 
easement and would not unduly burden the servient tenement. 
[1] Right to maintain gates or bars across right of way, note, 
73 A.L.R. 778. See, also, Cal.Jur., Easements, § 8; Am.Jur., Ease-
ments, §§ 120-124. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Easements, § 38; [2, 10, 11] Ease-
ments, § 37; [3J Nuisances, § 62; Trespass, § 26; [4J Damages, § 22; 
[5] Damages, § 171; [6, 8, 9] Appeal and Error, §1431; [7] 




220 HERZOG V. GROSSO [41 C.2d 
[3J Nuisancea--Damages: Trespass-Damages.-Once a cause of 
action for trespass or nuisance is established, an occupant of 
land may recover damages for annoyance and discomfoIt that 
would naturally ensue therefrom. 
[4] Damagea--Mental Sufi'ering.-Owners of easement for road 
purposes lL.ay properly be awarded damages for suffering 
caused by fear for safety of their daughter and visitors as a 
natural cousequence of acts of owner of servient tenement in 
increasing grade of road, dumping large quantities of dirt on 
road, and otherwise making road dangerous for use. 
[5J ld.-Burden of Proof.,-Where owners of easement for road 
purposes establish their damages by showing depreciation in 
value of their property resulting from acts of owners of ser-
vient tenement in increasing grade of road, it is then incum-
bent on the latter to come forward with proof that the cost 
of restoration would be less than the depreciation in value. 
[6] Appeal- Determination - Reversal- Avoiding Inconsistent 
Judgments.-Rule that an appellate court will not permit a 
trial court to reach diametrically opposite conclusions on 
similar evidence as to the same occurrence is inapplicable when 
the two decisions may be reconciled. 
[7] Damagea--Excessive Damagea--Depreciation in Value of Prop-
etty.-An award of $7,000 for depreciation in value of property 
resulting from increased grade of road on adjoining property 
is not excessive as a matter of law where there is no evidence 
showing the cost of restoring the road to its original condition. 
[8J Appeal- Determination - Reversal- Avoiding Inconsistent 
Judgments.-If an injunctiol.l. requiring defendant to make 
alterations on a road applies to an encroachment for which 
a money judgment is awarded, the trial court in effect made 
conflicting findings, in which event reversal would be necessary 
unless the evidence establishes as a matter of law that injury 
to plaintiffs' property was or was not permanent. 
[9] ld.-Determination - Reversal- Avoiding Inconsistent Judg-
ments.-Where compliance with an injunction requiring de-
fendant to alter a roa,} to conform to a map will do nothing 
more than remove a hump in the first part of the road and 
will not change the steep slope on the remainder of the road, 
on which an award of damages is based, the mandatory in-
junction and the award of damages apply to separate results 
of defendant's conduct, and there is no inconsistency in grant-
ing the injunction and awarding damages. 
[4] Right to recover for mental pain and anguish alone, apart 
from other damages, notes, 23 A.L.R. 361; 44 A.L.R. 428; 56 A.L.E. 
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[10] Easements-Maintenance-Repairs.-It was error to order 
the owner of the servient tenement to pave part of the road 
after altering it to conform to a map attached to the decree 
where the owners of the easement had previously had a dirt 
surfaced road. 
[11] Id.-Maintenance-Repairs.-Ordinarily the owner of a ser-
vient tenement is under no duty to maintain and repair the 
easement. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Modified and 
affirmed. 
Action to quiet title to an easement and for other relief. 
Judgment for plaintiffs modified and affirmed. 
W. P. Smith and Henry F. Walker for Appellants. 
Nathan E. Gillin and Button & Herzog for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-This action presents a controversy between 
owners of a private road and easement and the owners of 
the servient tenement. The following diagram, not drawn 
to scale, shows the relationship of the road and easement to 
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Mrs. Mildred Schneider originally owned the land bound~d 
by Blair Drive, Hollywood Freeway, the Rosin property, 
and the Universal Pictures property. The land is hilly with 
the crest of the hill at the center. Plaintiffs Leonard and 
Alma Herzog purchased parcel 1 in 1944 and built a home 
thereon. At that time the only access to a public road from 
parcel 1 was a road over the Rosin property to Barham 
Boulevard. Since Rosin retained the right to revoke per-
mission to use the road, plaintiffs did not buy parcel 1 until 
Mrs. Schneider deeded to them parcel 2, a strip of land 25 
feet wide. and granted them an easement for road and public 
utility purposes over 'parcel 3, a strip of land 30 feet wide 
and 155 feet long. A road was bulldozed around the hill on 
parcels 2 and 3 from parcel 1 to Blair Drive. A telephone 
pole was erected on parcel 3 at the point marked "x" on the 
diagram, about 115 feet from Blair Drive. The road was 
dirt surfaced. about 14 feet wide, and sloped downhill from 
Blair Drive to plaintiffs' home. The grade was about 4.5 
per cent to the telephone' pole and about 8.3 per cent for 
the next 110 feet. Plaintiffs used both the Rosin road to 
Barham Boulevard and the new road to Blair Drive. 
Mr. and Mrs. Connor bought the property to the west of 
parcels 2 and 3 in December, 1945. Defendants Paul and 
Madolyn Grosso acquired parcel 3 and the hilltop property 
in March, 1949. Difficulties between defendants and plain-
tiffs soon arose. In November, 1949, Paul Grosso regraded 
the road from his property to Blair Drive. He dumped large 
quantities of dirt on parcels 2 and 3 and on the Connor 
property.· The regrading resulted in a fill that blocked all 
passage from plaintiff's' property to Blair Drive. Plaintiffs 
protested and were assured that the road would eventually 
be made passablt!, but it remained blocked. In March, 1950, 
defendants erected a fence at the point where parcel 3 joined 
Blair Drive. The fence extended across 14 feet of the ease-
ment and was equipped with gates designed to close the 
remaining 16 feet. 
On September 2, 1950, plaintiffs received notice that they 
could no longer use the Rosin road. Thereafter their only 
access to the public streets was over parcels 2 and 3. After 
further protests by plaintiffs, Grosso cut a ramp across the 
fill to parcel 2. The new road ran on the west side of the 
• An aetion by Mrs. Connor against the Grossos for the dumping on 
the Connor property was eonsolidntC'd for trial with the present case. 
(See CoatiOf' .... Gr08'o, 1100f, p. 229 [259 P.2d 435].) 
•.... ) 
) 
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telephone pole, on the Connor property. The road was nar· 
row, steep, and dangerous. In early October Herzog placed 
posts and reflectors along the edge of the road to prevent 
automobiles from going over the bank. Grosso removed the 
posts and reflectors. In November, 1950, plaintiffs engaged 
a contractor to pave parcels 2 and 3. Grosso ordered the 
men to leave and when they did not do· so, dumped dirt on 
the parts of the road that had been tine graded preparatory 
to tinal surfacing. Several days later Grosso dug up the road 
with a plow attached to a tractor. On December 20th, plain. 
tiffs obtained a temporary restraining order, and thereafter 
Grosso did not interfere with plaintiffs' use of the road. In 
February, 1951, plaintiffs paved the road and placed it in 
the condition it was in at the time of the trial, May, 1951. 
During the period between September, 1950, and February, 
1951, it was difficult to use the road. In rainy weather the 
road was slippery, and plaintiffs were forced to leave their 
car at the entrance and walk through the mud. 
The road was surveyed shortly before the trial. The grade 
over the fill made by Grosso was level for the first 68 feet 
from Blair Drive, thence 4.3 per cent uphill to a point near 
the telephone pole, thence 14.6 per cent downhill for the next 
110 feet. One 40·foot part of this 110 feet had a grade of 
17.2 per cent. At the telephone pole the fill was 6 feet over 
the original level. An appraiser. duly qualified as an expert 
witness, testified that "the steep grade immediately approach. 
ing the short turn and a steep incline is snfficient cause for 
an estimate of damage. This condition creates an extreme 
fire hazard and safety hazard to all users. J , He stated 
that the road was ., like driving into the banks of the Grand 
Canyon. " The appraiser testified that in his opinion the 
increase in grade had depreciated the fair market value of 
the property by $8,700. 
The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiffs. 
The judgment declares plaintiffs' and defendants' respective 
rights in the easement; orders defendant Paul Grosso to alter 
the first 120 feet of parcel 3 to conform to a map attached 
to the judgment; orders defendants to remove the fence and 
gate at the entrance; and enjoins defendants from interfering 
with plaintiffs' use of the easement. The judgment also 
awards plaintiffs damages against defendant Paul Grosso as 
follows: $7,000 to both plaintiffs for permanent depreciation 
in the value of their property; $521.82 to both plaintiBs as 
) 
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compensation for miscellaneous expenditures; $2,000 to plain-
tiff husband and $2,000 to plaintiff wife for interference with 
their comfortable use and enjoyment of their home; $1,500 
to plaintiff husband and $1,500 to plaintiff wife for worry 
and anxiety for the safety of themselves, their daughter, and 
their guests; $2,000 to plaintiff husband and $2,000 to plain-
tiff wife as exemplary damages. Defendants appeal from 
the judgment. 
The judgment provides that defendants do not have "any 
estate, right, title or interest whatsoever in and to said ease-
ment" and that defendants "are hereby forever enjoined 
and restrained from asserting any claim whatsoever in and 
to plaintiffs' said easement." Defendants contend that the 
decree unduly restricts their rights in parcel 3, that it is the 
only means of access to Blair Drive for themselves and their 
employees, agents, guests, and deliverymen, and that they 
have to use parcel 3 to obtain water, telephone, electricity, 
gas and other public utility facilities. Other parts of the 
judgment provide that defendants are the owners "in fee 
simple of the thirty foot strip of land in, upon, under and 
over which plaintiffs' said easement described in said parcel 
3 extends"; that defendants have the right to nse parcel 3 
for road purposes; and that defendants may use parcel 3 
for other purposes "consistent with the employment of said 
easement by plaintiffs and which does [not] unreasonably 
interfere with the use of said easement by plaintiffs." It 
thus appears that the judgment does not unreasonably re-
strain defendants from the use of parcel 3. 
[1] The judgment declares that defendants have no right 
to maintain the fence and gates at the juncture of the road 
and Blair Drive and orders their removal forthwith. De-
fendants contend that the trial court erred, relying on the 
rule that "the owner of the servient tenement may make any 
use of the land that does not interfere unreasonably with 
the easement." (Pasadena v. California-Michigan etc. Co., 
17 Ca1.2d 576, 579 [110 P.2d 983, 133 A.L.R. 1186].) The 
trial court found that the fence and gates interfered with 
plaintiffs' free use and enjoyment of the easement. Plaintiffs' 
home is located in a large city and the road should be kept 
unobstructed for adequate access by the fire department, 
police department, and other public agencies. (Cf. Los An-
geles City Ordinance 97940, § 18.09.) The trial court did 
not go beyond the evidence in this case by ordering the re-
moval of the fence and gates. (See Smith T. Wom, 93 Cal. 
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206, 214-215 [28 P. 944J.) Defendants suggest that they 
should be allowed to maintain the gates and fence to prevent 
motorists from mistaking the road for a public road and 
entering defendants' property. Plaintiffs concede that de-
fendants are "free to put up any sign deemed necessary as 
would not unreasonably interfere with plaintiffs' use of the 
easement. " It would appear that defendants could thus be 
adequately protected. 
[2] The judgment provides that "plaintiffs have a right 
to construct and maintain a wooden guard rail on parcel 
3 along the northwesterly boundary thereof, said guard rail 
to be one of the general types usually used along public high-
ways. " Defendants contend that the judgment thereby un-
duly burdened the servient tenement. By the grant of the 
easement, however, plaintiffs acquired the right to do such 
things as are reasonably necessary to their use thereof. (Ward 
v. City of Monrovia, 16 Cal.2d 815, 821-822 [108 P.2d 425] ; 
North Fork Water Co. v. Edwards, 121 Cal. 662, 666 [54 P. 
69] ; 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 76b.) Since the road adjoins a 
steep embankment, guardrails are reasonably necessary and 
would not unduly burden the servient tenement. 
The trial court found that ,. as a direct, natural and proxi-
mate result and consequence of the acts and conduct of the 
defendant . . . each of said plaintiffs were caused further 
to suffer nervousness, worry, and mental distress for the 
safety of themselves and their daughter and others obliged 
to use said road on account of the dangerous conditions under 
which said defendant, Paul J. Grosso, forced them and their 
family to use said parcels 2 and 3 in going to and from their 
said home." Damages of $1,500 were awarded to each plain-
tiff. Defendant contends that the award cannot be sustained 
insofar as it is predicated upon distress and worry for "the 
safety of ... their daughter and others." [3] Once a 
cause of action for trespass or nuisance is established, an occu-
pant of land may recover damages for annoyance and dis-
comfort that would naturally ensue therefrom. (Anderson 
v. Souza, 38 Ca1.2d 825. 833 [243 P.2d 497] ; Judson v. Los 
Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 168, 172 [106 P. 581, 21 
Ann.Cas. 1247, 26 L.R.A.N.S. 183]; Thompson v. Simonds, 
68 Cal.App.2d 151, 162 [155 P.2d 870]; Rest., Torts, 
§ 929(c), com. g.) In Alonso v. Hills, 95 Cal.App.2d 778 
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ing operations, the court sustained an award for discomfort, 
fright, and shock caused by a blast that occurr~d at a time 
when plaintiff was not at home. The court stated: "Plaintiff 
testified that after the February 3 blast (in which a rock 
destroyed a bench on the property near which one of his 
daughters was standing) he could not rest or sleep because 
of fear for his own security and that of his family. This is 
a form of discomfort for which plaintiff under the circum-
stances of this case is entitled to recover, as well as for other 
discomfort not challenged on appeal." (95 Cal.App.2d at 
788.) [4] Similarly, in the present case the suffering 
caused by fear for the safety of the daughter and visitors 
was a natural consequence of defendant's conduct and an 
invasion of a protectible interest of an occupant of real prop-
erty. The cases relied upon by defendant did not involve 
an invasion of a protectible interest in real property and are 
therefore not controlling here. 
The judgment awarded plaintiffs $7,000 against defendant 
Paul Grosso for the permanent depreciation in the value of 
their property resulting from the increased grade of the 
road. Defendant asserts that removal of about 700 cubic 
yards of dirt would restore parcels 2 and 3 to their original 
condition. Defendant then contends that the trial court 
awarded excessive damages, on the ground that when the 
cost of restoration is less than the depreciation in value, the 
former is the measure of damages. (Cf. Green v. General 
Petroleum 00.,205 Cal. 328, 336 [270 P. 952,60 A.L.R. 475].) 
This contention cannot be sustained. [5] Plaintiffs estab-
lished their damages by showing the depreciation in value. 
It was then incumbent upon defendants to come forward 
with proof that the cost of restoration would be less. (Per-
kins v. Bla1dh, 163 Cal. 782, 792-793 [127 P. 50].) They 
failed to do so. Defendants point out that in the companion 
case of Oonnor v. Grosso, post, p. 229 [259 P.2d 435], the 
trial court found that the cost of removal of 3,184 cubic 
yards of dirt from the Connor property would be $4,362.08, 
and that the cost of removing 1,570% cubic yards therefrom 
would be $2,563.85. [6] Defendants rely on decisions hold-
ing that an appellate court will not permit a trial court to 
reach diametrically opposite conclusions upon similar evi· 
dence as to the same occurrence. (Ferroni v. Pacific Finance 
Oorp., 21 Cal.2d 773, 780 [135 P.2d 569] ; Southern Pac. 00. 
v. Oity of Los Angeles. 5 Ca1.2d 545. 548 [55 P.2d 847].) 
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reconciled. (DiZlard v. McKnight, 34 Ca1.2d 209, 224-225 
[209 P.2d 387, 11 A.L.R.2d 835].) In the companion case 
the dirt could be removed from the side of a hill; in the pres-
ent case the dirt would have to be taken from a narrow road 
where equipment would have difficulty in operating. In addi-
tion to the cost of removing the dirt defendant in the present 
case would have to regrade and resurface the road and pro-
vide for drainage. [7] Aside from the evidence in the 
Connor case, there is no evidence in the record showing the 
cost of restoring parcels 2 and 3 to their original condition. 
Thus, we cannot say as a matter of law that the award of 
$7,000 is excessive. 
In addition to the award of $7,000 as damages for perma-
nent depreciation of plaintiffs' property, the judgment 
orders defendant Paul Grosso to "make alterations in the 
road over and upon the northerly 120 feet" of the easement 
•• so that same will conform to and be in accordance with the 
plan shown on the aforesaid Private Street Map, plaintiffs' 
Exhibit No. 60." Defendant contends that the judgment 
thereby allows a double recovery to plaintiffs, on the ground 
that the mandatory injunction requires defendant to correct 
a condition for which plaintiffs are awarded damages. (See 
Spaulding v. Cameron, 38 Ca1.2d 265, 269 [239 P.2d 625J.) 
It is contended that· any error in the judgment may be 
cured by deleting the injunction. [8] If the injunction 
applies to an encroachment for which a money judgment is 
awarded, the trial court in effect made conflicting findings, 
first that the injury to plaintiffs' property was abatable. and 
then that it was permanent. In that event, unless the evi· 
dence established as a matter of law that the injury was or 
was not permanent. reversal would be necessary. since "it 
would be inappropriate for this court to determine whether 
the nuisance is in fact permanent and to modify the judg-
ment by striking the damages for loss of market value on 
the assumption it is not permanent, or by striking the in-
junctive provisions on the assumption that it is. (Tupman 
v. Haberk.ern, 208 Cal. 256, 269·270 [280 P. 970].)" (Spauld-
ing v. Cameron, supra, 38 Ca1.2d at 270.) Accordingly, the 
determinative question here is whether the mandatory in. 
junction applies to a condition for which plaintiffs are also 
awarded damages. 
[9] Before defendant Paul Grosso placed the dirt on 
parcels 2 and 3, the grade of the road averaged 4.5 per cent 
) 
) 
228 HERZOG tI. GROSSO l41 C.2d 
downhill from Blair Drive to a point near the telephone 
pole, about 115 feet from Blair Drive, and averaged about 
S.3 per cent downhill over the next 110 feet. After defend-
ant changed the slope of the road, the grade was level for 
the :Brst 68 feet from Blair Drive, thence about 4.3 per cent 
uphill to a point near the teleph,)De pole, and thence down-
hill for 110 feet at an average grade of 14.6 per cent and of 
17.2 per cent for 40 of the 110 feet. The fill was 6 feet deep 
at the telephone pole. From the testimony of the engineer 
who prepared the, map referred to in the injunction and from 
an examination of the map itself, it is clear that altering 
the road to conform to the map will do nothing more than 
remove the hump in the first part of the road. Compliance 
with the injunction will not change the steep slope on the 
remainder of parcel 2 and parcel 3. There is no inconsistency 
in finding that some of the dirt dumped on plaintiffs' prop-
erty may be removed and that other dirt dumped in a differ-
ent place permanently depreciated the property. The award 
of $7,000 damages is based on the testimony of H. V. John-
son, an appraiser. That witness based his opinion on the 
steepness of the road, not upon the hump in the first part 
of the road. The mandatory injunction and the . award of 
damages thus apply to separate results of defendant's eon-
duct. 
[10] Defendant Paul Grosso contends that the trial court 
erred in ordering him to pave the north part of the road after 
altering it to conform with the map attached to the decree. This 
contention must be sustained. When defendants purchased 
their property. plaintiffs had a dirt surfaced road on the 
easement. [11] Ordinarily, the owner of the servient tene-
ment is under no duty to maintain or repair the easement. 
(Bean v. Stoneman, 104 Cal. 49. 56 [37 P. 777, 38 P. 39]; 
Rose v. Peters, 59 Cal.App.2d 833. 835 [139 P.2d 983].) 
Defendant may be required to alter the north 120 feet of the 
road to conform with the map. but he may not be required 
to pave the road for the benefit of plaintiffs. 
The judgment is modified by deleting that part of para-
graph 19 reading: "and that wherein said map does not 
specify the details of construction of said road said defend-
ants shall construct said road in accordance with the require· 
ments of Standard Specifications No. 151 for Public Improve-
ment as promulgated by the Department of Public Works 
of the City of Los Angeles. California, and approved by the 
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in effect." As so modified the judgment is affirmed.. De-
fendant Paul Grosso is to bear the costs of this appca 1. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, 
J., and Spence, J., concurred. 
